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 Bake Machou is a woman of about 35 years of age in North Benin2). 
She belongs to the Fulani, a people of cattle keepers whom you can meet everywhere in West 
Africa. Bake is married, but has no children. Her husband, I’ll call him Amadou, has a 
second, younger wife, who does have children. Amadou has some cattle and grows sorghum, 
maize and cotton. They live, together with Amadou’s brother and his family, in a wuro, a 
compound in a cattle keepers’ camp near Alifiarou, 20 km from Kandi. Bake makes and sells 
cheese. She earns about $ 0.75 per preparation cycle, i.e. on average two or three times a 
week, in the rainy season only.  But sometimes she earns next to nothing. The grain to 
prepare meals she obtains from her husband. With the money that she earns from cheese 
selling she covers her personal expenditure for clothing, kerosene, jewellery and buys the 
ingredients for the sauce she prepares for every meal. Because she does not have to spend 
money on children, she has managed in the course of time to buy some cattle, goats and sheep 
of her own. In the dry season, when there is no milk, Bake has no income. She then depends 
on her husband. (IJsendijk 1999). 
  
 Boureima is a rich cattle trader from Malanville in North Benin3). He 
buys cattle at the local markets. His apprentice takes care of the animals once they are 
bought. When he has bought 20 to 30 head after two or three weeks, Boureima rents a truck 
and takes the cattle to Cotonou, a large city 700 km to the south. On the way he has to bribe 
officials at least 7 road blocks. At the cattle market in Cotonou Boureima sells his cattle to 
butchers through a middleman. It may take a few weeks before all the cattle is sold and 
Boureima gets his money, but then he has earned some $ 400. If prices on the market of 
Lomé, in neighbouring Togo, are better, he unloads his cattle some 200 km north of Cotonou 
and hires herders who trek the cattle on the hoof secretly across the border. Boureima himself 
takes a taxi to Lomé. If the market of Ibadan in Nigeria looks more profitable, he sends the 
cattle across the border in North Benin, again on the hoof to stay clear of customs. Then he 
hires a truck in Nigeria to continue the journey.  
Boureima also owns many cattle. These are herded by his family or friendly cattle keepers. 
He donates much money to the mosque and he has made a pilgrimage to Mecca, hence his 
honorary title El Hadji (Quarles van Ufford 1999a; 1999b). 
 
* Figure 1 - Bake Machou’s home and Boureima’s trading routes * 
 
Bake and Boureima live in what we have for a long time called the Third World. Their life 
histories are examples of the diversity of livelihood and prosperity we may find there. 
In this paper I will argue in section 1 that the label ‘Third World’ is not appropriate any more. 
On the one hand, quite a number of countries have reached an acceptable standard of living. 
On the other hand, the diversity in prosperity and welfare between and within countries has 
increased. Still inherent in the development process is that some groups are included and 
others are excluded. Therefore, processes of social inclusion and exclusion remain in the 
focus of development studies. In section 2, I will discuss how these processes of social 
inclusion and exclusion should be studied. People’s livelihood strategies will be taken as a 
point of departure and  then I will focus on actor-structure interactions. In section 3, the 
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effects of today’s globalisation on livelihood are discussed. In the conclusion, I will determine 
the consequences for development studies. 
 
 
1. Does the Third World still exist? 
 
 
 What constituted the Third World was obvious to many of us some 40 years ago. It 
was the countries outside North America, Western Europe, Australia and Japan and outside 
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. In this section I will show that the notion ‘Third World’ 
is not appropriate any more, but that social exclusion is still apparent on a large scale and 
therefore remain the focus of development studies. 
The name ‘Third World’ originated in the 1950s by analogy with the ‘Tiers Etat’ in France 
before the Revolution. The ‘Tiers Etat’ were the poor, weakly developed population groups, 
exploited and oppressed by the other classes: nobility and clergy (Kleinpenning 1978, p.4). 
‘Third World’ was synonymous in the 1960s with ‘poor, hardly developed’ and actually also 
with ‘exploited and oppressed’. The name gained popularity because it also suggested a third 
road of development between the Western capitalist world and the Soviet Communist world. 
People were, of course, aware of the differentiation in the Third World, but the idea that the 
countries had more in common was widespread. Western writers pointed in particular at the 
prevailing poverty and, therefore, the need to improve the standards of living. This unifying 
aspect was even strengthened at the end of the 1960s by the rise of the dependencia theory. 
The ‘dependencia’ theory pointed more than previous theories at the unequal (the word is in 
fact asymmetrical) incorporation of these countries into the world market as the underlying 
cause of poverty. This asymmetry had already started in colonial times, when Third World 
countries’ economies became restructured to cater not for their own needs, but for those of the 
colonial motherland. This dependency continued after political independence.  
In this view, a line could be drawn through the world, dividing the dominant, capitalist 
countries of the centre from the dominated countries in the periphery. The line was clear cut 
and ran along the Rio Grande between the United States and Mexico, through the 
Mediterranean between Western Europe and Africa, and then farther east across the Central 
Asian mountain ranges. 
 
 Of course some questioned this supposed homogeneity of the Third World. They 
pointed at differences in prosperity, dissimilar forms of colonisation and of socio-economic 
systems, and at the enormous cultural heterogeneity. Others were convinced that countries 
like China and North Korea and, later, Cuba, Vietnam, Cambodia and Burma and, still later, 
Angola and Mozambique no longer belonged to the Third World, because they had broken 
away from the asymmetrical relationship with the countries in the centre. These countries did 
not gained from immediately from the break in terms of wealth, but it was claimed that the 
qualitative breakthrough of dependency was a gain in itself. 
Moreover, a considerable improvement in the standard of living was achieved in a number of 
countries. In the dominant view of exploitation of the periphery by the centre this was not 
considered to be possible. At first, people spoke rather scathingly about the success of mini-
states like Hong Kong and Singapore, but soon other Asian Tigers or ‘Newly Industrialising 
Countries’ like Taiwan and South-Korea could no longer be considered to belong to the Third 
World.  
3 
 
 
The interesting issue was that, contrary to the dependencia discussion, the rise of standards of 
living in these countries did not originate from loosening the ties with the capitalist world 
market, but, was based on the growth of a world market-oriented export industry. 
Thanks to a sharp rise in prices of oil, a number of other countries experienced a rapid growth 
in prosperity in the 1970s, too. Although, in some countries, the newly acquired wealth 
disappeared like snow before the sun, in others, especially in the Middle East, it proved to be 
sustainable. In particular Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, 
Libya, Gabon and Trinidad are exemplary. 
Thus, in the course of time, the Third World shrank. In addition, attention was drawn to poles 
of development in Third World countries. Whether they were the export production zones of 
Mexico and Malaysia, the metropoles of Brazil or the tourist areas of Turkey; they were said 
to be little different from developed countries. Thus the image of the Third World became 
even more fuzzy and more fragmented. 
 
And then in 1989 the Berlin Wall fell and the Second World vanished. If I were to follow 
Fukuyama  (1992) and his proposition about “The End of History”, then the whole world 
would soon be uniform. He thinks that the fall of the Berlin Wall marks the end of the history 
of ideas and that there is no longer any alternative to western neoliberalism. In his view, the 
‘Third World’ as a road of development between capitalism and communism no longer exists. 
Neither does he consider Islamic fundamentalism, Asian authoritarianism or nationalism to be 
serious alternatives. According to the author economy and politics are inevitably developing 
in the direction of a globalising free market and a liberal democracy. 
 Others have greater difficulties in abandoning thinking about the world in terms of 
power blocks. This perhaps explains the popularity of an author who has pointed to potential 
new global dividing walls. I am referring to Huntington (1993), who in his “Clash of 
Civilisations” considers the interactions between cultures to be a new source of conflicts. 
Contrary to Fukuyama, he does not discern one world, but no fewer than eight large 
civilisations between which conflicts may emerge. The most virulent frontier is the one 
between the western Christian civilisation in Europe, North America and Oceania and the 
Islamic civilisation that runs from Africa through the Middle East to Indonesia. Then there are 
the Orthodox Christian, encompassing the Greek and Slavic world, the African, the Hindu-
Indian, the Japanese and the Confucian civilisations. 
 Fukuyama and Huntington point at contradictory trends: the former draws our 
attention to a trend towards ideological uniformity; the latter confronts us again with the wide 
cultural diversity in the world. However, both pass over the large differences in prosperity 
which still exist  in the world, and even increase. 
 
 Is a new demarcation of the Third World still meaningful? And which? If member 
states of the European Union like Greece and Portugal are considered to be developed 
countries and we know that Mexico and South Korea are now members of the OECD 
(Organisation for Economic Development and Co-operation), which is generally considered 
to be the organisation of developed countries, then we should consider all the countries 
classified by the World Bank as ‘upper-middle-income’ and ‘high-income countries’ to be 
developed (World Bank 1999). In that case, the rest must then be considered as the Third 
World. This is fascinating, because it means that, besides Mexico, Botswana, Malaysia, Chile, 
Uruguay, Venezuela and Brazil and a few others are no longer relevant to development 
studies. However, we do receive a few pungent cases in return like Cuba, Albania, Bulgaria, 
Romania, Ukraine, Russia and all the Central Asian republics and China, because these are 
‘lower middle-income countries’. 
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 Moreover, this theoretical exercise in classifying countries is based on only one 
criterion, i.e. GNP per capita, which I think is biased. Since 1990, UNDP (United Nations 
Development Program) has been trying with the Human Development Index (HDI) to do 
justice to the view that development is not only a matter of income or a decent standard of 
living but also of welfare. In addition to income, UNDP includes longevity and knowledge in 
its HDI. According to the latest HDI ranking, Costa Rica and Argentina may reckon 
themselves among the developed countries , but Hungary, Mexico and Saudi Arabia may not 
(UNDP 1999). Thus, there is no automatic relationship between economic prosperity and 
human welfare. 
 
 I admit that this presentation of the shrinking Third World is only a rough sketch and 
that there may be good arguments to skip some or add a few more countries. However, a 
preliminary conclusion impose itself, one which was already drawn by Harris (1986) in his 
‘The End of the Third World’. If the ‘Third World’ ever existed, then it certainly does not 
exist any more and all the other labels like ‘the developing countries’ or ‘the South’ miss the 
point too, which is (1) that quite a number of countries have reached an acceptable standard of 
living and (2) that the diversity in prosperity and welfare between and within countries has 
increased. 
Firstly, according to the Human Development Report of 1998 (UNDP 1998) income in ‘low’ 
and ‘middle-income countries’ increased by 250% between 1960 and 1995, against only 80% 
in ‘high-income countries’. Life expectancy increased from 46 to 62 years and infant 
mortality decreased from 149 per thousand to 65. Between 1970 and 1995 illiteracy decreased 
from 52 to 30% and food consumption rose by 20%. 
Secondly, and these are figures becoming increasingly significant for the globalising world, in 
1960, the richest 20% of the world had 30 times the income of the poorest 20%, but by 1995 
the gap had increased to 82 times; illiteracy in rural areas is twice that in urban areas; the 
literacy of women is 17% lower than that of men; women earn only 1/3 of the total income, 
which means that men earn 2/3. Moreover, 1.3 billion people live on an income of less than 
1$ a day, 841 million are malnourished, 880 million have no access to health care, 885 
million adults are illiterate (UNDP 1998). 
 
 Therefore, if we put the poverty line, for the sake of convenience and not without 
cynicism, at a monetary income equal to $1 purchasing power per day, then 20% of the 6 
billion people in the world live in poverty. If we put the line at $2, then we are talking about 
as much as half of the world population. Thus we have to conclude that, despite the progress 
made, between 20% and 50% of the world population is excluded from this progress. This 
exclusion no longer relates to countries as a whole, but rather to social groups and areas 
within countries. Moreover, for Westeuropeans it becomes clear that it concerns not only 
people in remote, exotic places, but also people not far from where they live: in Albania or in 
Slovakia, and even in their own metropolises. 
Finally, we should be aware that, as a society’s value system attaches less importance to what 
a person can do or does and more to what he or she possesses or consumes, then consumption 
becomes a means of feeling or becoming accepted by society. Social exclusion is a dynamic 
phenomenon. Just as in the Netherlands, a schoolkid without a mobile phone hardly counts 
and many municipal social services departments consider a television set and a subscription to 
a newspaper to be primary needs, in India a women is excluded from marriage where the level 
of a dowry is beyond the means of her family. It is important to note that social standards of 
consumption tend to rise faster than incomes. What was considered a luxury 30 years ago is 
now a necessity. For example, in the 1960s, 16 out of every 1000 Japanese owned a car, but in 
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the 1980s, when the same level of income was reached in Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Malaysia, 
car ownership was between 50 to 64 per 1000 inhabitants, that is 3 or 4 times as much (UNDP 
1998, pp.59- 60). 
 
 
2. Social exclusion and sustainable livelihood 
 
 
 What is still inherent in the development process, therefore, is that some groups are 
included and others are excluded. Processes of social inclusion and exclusion are part of the 
development process and, because development studies, have, or at least should have, a 
normative preoccupation with the poor and the marginalised, these processes should be in the 
focus of our work. I will demonstrate in this section, elaborating on the concept of  
sustainable livelihood as a point of departure and paying attention to actor-structure 
interactions, how these processes of social inclusion and exclusion can be studied. 
 
 The notion of ‘social exclusion’ became popular in the political debate in Western 
Europe and in the discussion of the underclass in the United States. It refers to the lack of 
access to social security, to employment, to safety, to human rights etc., in brief, to a decent 
living (ILO, 1996). In development studies, this notion finds its parallel in the concept of 
sustainable livelihood as the way in which people make themselves a living using their 
capabilities and their tangible and intangible assets (Chambers 1995). Livelihood is 
sustainable if it is adequate for the satisfaction of self-defined basic needs and proof against 
shocks and stresses. If livelihood is sustainable, it is synonymous with social inclusion; if not, 
it equates with social exclusion. I therefore find it important to elaborate on the concept of 
sustainable livelihood 4). 
 
Livelihood strategies 
 
 Livelihood is not necessarily the same as having a job and does not necessarily even 
have anything to do with working. Moreover, although obtaining a monetary income is an 
important part of livelihood, it is not the only aspect that matters. It is quite conceivable for 
somebody with a low monetary income to be better off than someone with a higher monetary 
income. The poverty lines of $1 or $2 I referred to above have therefore to be treated with 
circumspection.  
Generally, poor people undertake manifold activities which yield them food, housing, money 
etc. The most common of these are the production of crops, livestock, clothing and housing 
for home consumption; the production of crops and livestock for sale; trade; handicrafts such 
as basket weaving, pottery, carpentry; seasonal or permanent wage labour, which includes 
children; remittances by kin who have emigrated; loans, alms, gifts and sometimes corruption. 
 
 In Bake’s compound all the crops and vegetables produced are 
consumed at home. Bake’s husband seldom sells cattle, although occasionally a sheep. In 
fact, he earns his money by growing cotton for the market. His second wife is allowed to sell 
part of the milk production, the rest of the milk is also consumed at home. Bake buys milk to 
produce cheese, which is her main source of income. She also keeps some sheep and goats 
near the compound and has a tiny vegetable garden. She obviously has a lot of housekeeping 
to do, such as fetching water, washing clothes and cooking. The family constructed their huts 
themselves and these are maintained by the men. Last year her husband was asked by a 
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peasant to look after his cow, so this cow is included in the herd. The milk and every second 
calf from this cow may be kept in return 
 Boureima’s livelihood is much more specialised, but also more 
complex. He buys and sells cattle and lives on the profit. He buys cattle for cash at the market 
place or in the cattle keeper’s compound. Sometimes he borrows money on them so that he 
can later buy cattle at a cheaper price. He also lends money to local authorities in order not 
to be troubled by them with permits and regulations. Boureima supplies food and lodging to 
his apprentice. He also needs money to pay truck drivers and herders for the transport to the 
south and to bribe customs officials on the road. Part of his own herd is looked after by a 
paid herder. The other part is taken care of by family and friendly herders under the same 
conditions as described above with reference to Bake’s husband. Boureima had his house in 
Malanville build by a mason. He is a well respected and wealthy man and is expected to give 
alms to the poor. 
 
  Following Blaikie et al. (1994), Chambers and Conway (1992), Chambers (1995) and 
Carney (1999a), we may state that people need five vital resources in order to achieve a 
sustainable a sustainable livelihood (see fig 2). We can call those resources (1) ‘human’, (2) 
‘natural’, (3) ‘physical’, (4) ‘financial’ and (5) ‘social’ capital 5):  
1. human capital can be labour, but also skills, experience, knowledge, creativity and 
inventiveness; 
2. natural capital is resources like land, water, forests and pastures, but also minerals; 
3. physical capital can be food stocks, livestock, jewellery, equipment, tools and machinery; 
4. financial capital is money in a savings account at the bank or in an old sock, a loan or 
credit. 
5. social capital concerns the quality of relations among people, for example, whether one can 
count on support by family or mutual assistance among neighbours. I will return to this 
topic later. 
 
 I propose to use the notion ‘capital’ for the five vital fields that livelihood rests upon, 
firstly because it puts on a par various terms like ‘resource’, ‘asset’ and ‘capital’ and brings 
them together under a common denominator. Secondly, it draws a parallel with the discussion 
on social capital. The notion ‘capital’ is an economic metaphor according to Carney (1999a), 
which does not do justice to the nature of social relationships which are not entirely oriented 
towards material gain. However, material gains are a very important aim in the notion of 
livelihood. Thirdly, even with respect to non-material motives and aims, it is possible and 
useful to apply terms like opportunities, investments and gains in order to arrive at a better 
understanding of livelihood strategies. I shall therefore continue to use the notion of ‘capital’. 
 
  ‘Capital’ does not necessarily have to be held in private property. Land, water and 
forests can be communally owned. What matters is if one has access to the resource when it is 
needed and wanted. Chambers and Conway (1992) therefore distinguish, next to ‘resources’ 
and ‘stores’ (cattle, equipment, stocks), which together constitute ‘tangible assets’, ‘non-
tangible assets’. ‘Non-tangible assets’ consist of ‘claims’ and ‘access’. By ‘claims’ they mean 
that people can call upon moral and practical assistance. ‘Access’ means having or getting the 
opportunity to use the resource in practice. Thus it refers to the real opportunity to gather 
firewood in the forest or to use water for irrigation from the village well. According to 
Chambers (1995), it also refers to the possibility for women to obtain food from the 
compound’s granary, or the access by men to information about prices for cattle or the 
possibilities for temporary wage labour elsewhere in the region. 
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 Among the Fulani, men do the milking. They determine how much milk 
to leave for the calves; the rest is distributed amongst the women of the family. The quantity 
of milk a women receives depends, among other things, on how many children she has. Bake 
has no children, but she received enough milk to be able to sell some of it. Then, when the 
children of her husband’s second wife were old enough to milk the cattle of their father’s 
herd, they gave preference to their mother over Bake in distributing the milk. Bake therefore 
did not have any milk left to sell, so that she was deprived of her traditional source of income. 
 
 Blaikie et al. (1994) has elaborated the access aspect further in an ‘access model to 
maintain livelihood’. According to him, every household and every member of it has a certain 
access profile to resources and tangible assets which depend on one’s rights , for example, 
property rights, by tradition or by law. They differ per individual and per household and they 
may also change over time. Each actor (household, individual) decides on a choice of 
livelihood strategies on the basis of his access. The ‘access model’ resembles Sen’s 
‘entitlement’ (Sen 1981; Drèze and Sen 1989). The ‘endowment’ and ‘entitlement’ of actors 
are central in Sen’s view. ‘Endowment’ refers to owned assets and personal capacities 
through which an ‘entitlement’ to food can be exercised. ‘Entitlement’ is the way in which 
access to food is obtained, for example, by producing it with endowments like land, skill and 
plough; by selling labour or cash crops to buy food; by transfer of food or money through 
gifts and loans. 
Blaikie et al. (1994, p. 88) value the concept as well, despite their criticism that Sen’s initial 
notion to perceive endowments and entitlements was static and given, and their observation 
that it caused a constriction in the debate on famine by neglecting its multi-causality. 
Many authors have applied Sen’s ‘entitlement’ approach to fields of social interaction other 
than food security, such as to the exploitation of natural resources (cf. Dietz 1996). In this 
respect the work of the ‘Environmental Entitlements Research Team’ of the  Sussex Institute 
of Development Studies is noteworthy. Leach, Mearns and Scoones (1997, p.9) use the 
concept of  ‘environmental entitlements’, which refer to “alternative sets of benefits derived 
from environmental goods and services (cf. natural capital as one of the vital capitals -  LDH) 
over which people have legitimate effective command and which are instrumental in 
achieving well-being”...”Entitlements in turn enhance people’s capabilities, which are what 
people can do or be with their entitlements”. The same authors (Leach et al. 1999, p.240) 
analyse the role of institutions in community-based natural resource management. “In 
focussing attention on the mapping processes by which components of heterogeneous 
environments become endowments and entitlements of particular social actors” they provide a 
dynamic perspective on the role of institutions.  
 
 We may conclude that ‘access and claims’ come close to ‘social capital’, because if 
social capital in the broadest sense ‘includes the institutions, the relationships, the attitudes 
and values that govern interactions among people and contributes to economic and social 
development’ (World Bank 1998, p.1), then the access to a resource could also be considered 
as part of social capital. Having acknowledged this, I nevertheless include ‘access’ as a 
separate, because fundamental, element in my conceptual model, that determines the real use 
of ‘vital capitals’ (see fig. 2) 
 Carney (1999a) explains that there are various views on social capital, but that the 
following core elements can be distinguished: (1) relations of trust, reciprocity and exchange 
between individuals, (2) connectedness, networks and groups, including access to wider 
institutions and, (3) common rules, norms and sanctions mutually agreed or handed down 
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within societies. In my view, social capital concerns mutual help from neighbours, religious 
organisations, resource user groups, political parties etc. These are all manifestations of 
mutual engagements of people and, therefore, of importance to livelihood 
 
* Figure 2  - Actors’ livelihood strategies and five vital capitals * 
 
For Boureima trust is the key element in his management of relations. “Mutual trust is of 
utmost importance given the nature of his activities. Boureima must be able to count on the 
herders who drive his cattle across the border to do their job carefully. After all, they are 
being entrusted with a considerable and not insurable (physical) capital. He also has to trust 
that his middleman in Cotonou will do his best to judge the creditworthiness of the butchers 
and does everything to collect the outstanding credits. In their turn, the apprentice, herders 
and middleman have to trust Boureima to work with them again the next time. In the cattle 
trade there are no contracts, because of the absence of sanctions, trust is crucial” (Quarles 
van Ufford 1999a, p. 28 - my translation LDH). 
 
 In the long run, the livelihood strategies of actors such as individuals, households and 
other social groups constitute a ‘livelihood system’. In classic French geography a livelihood 
system was called ‘genre de vie’ (Claval 1974), i.e. a system of livelihood strategies of a 
human group in a specific region in which the interaction of society with the natural 
environment was emphasised. However, a livelihood system was not seen as inevitably 
determined by the natural environment. Social reality and force of habit were considered to be 
more important. Nevertheless a ‘genre de vie’ was considered as a unity of interaction of 
livelihood strategies with the natural environment and because of that it had a clear, spatial 
identity, called the region. 
The present view of a livelihood system is broader and more dynamic. In the 19th century one 
could write about the French regions as more or less independent units, nowadays livelihood, 
even in the remotest corners of the world, experiences a multitude of influences from a 
broader national and international economic, social and political context. Moreover, the man-
natural resources perspective has broadened into an interaction with various types of 
resources as indicated above, so that a livelihood system can no longer be regarded as a more 
or less closed regional system, but much more as a ‘complex ensemble of generically 
heterogeneous factors on various spatial levels of scale: natural and social, internal and 
external, historical and actual’ (Kleinpenning 1997 -  my translation LDH). What has 
remained is the view that livelihood systems are a social reality which, by force of habit, 
experience a certain inertia, so that it is sometimes hardly possible to reconstruct how they 
came into being (CASL 1998). Livelihood strategies are rooted in this social reality. In figure 
3,  the five vital ‘capitals’ are thus influenced by a social, economic, political and natural 
context. Note that, in this preliminary presentation, the context is undifferentiated and that the 
five vital ‘capitals’ are basically described in a local context. 
 
* Figure 3 - Preliminary presentation of livelihood and context * 
 
Coping and adaptive strategies 
 
 As indicated above, livelihood is sustainable if it is capable of adequately satisfying 
self-defined basic needs and securing people against shocks and stresses. Shocks are violent 
and come unexpectedly; stress is less violent, but can last longer. Both have their impact on 
one or more of the vital ‘capitals’. An environmental shock like a flood or an earthquake has 
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its impact on natural, human and physical capital. Drought is an example of a high-level 
environmental stress; seasonality is a well-known example of low-level environmental stress. 
A second source of shocks and stresses is the economy. Devaluation can raise prices of 
imported goods drastically, but may, at the same time, increase the attractiveness of growing 
certain export crops. Price policies aiming at low food prices in the cities may chronically 
frustrate the income generation of food producers in rural areas. A third source of shocks and 
stresses is politics, with violent conflict as an unfortunately not uncommon extreme. 
 An important contribution to the understanding of how these shocks have their 
differential impact on livelihood strategies was made in the 1980s by Sen (1981; Drèze and 
Sen 1989). He noticed that a crop failure caused by drought or some other reason resulted in 
famine only under certain conditions. A drought results in a famine only when people run out 
of stock, do not have good relations with others to borrow food, do not find employment to 
earn money to buy food, or when their savings are gone. Despite increasing food prices 
caused by scarcity, malfunctioning markets are not able to attract enough food from 
elsewhere. Sometimes food is being exported from famine areas, because there is a lack of 
purchasing power. Sometimes it is not drought or flooding that triggers famine, but forced 
food deliveries to the government. Thus, according to Sen, it is not only the limited access of 
actors to ‘vital capitals’ that causes famines, but also impacts stemming from a broader social, 
economic, political and natural context. 
 
 Because of contextual shocks and stresses, livelihood strategies temporarily take the 
shape of safety mechanisms called ‘coping strategies’. These are short-term responses to 
secure livelihood in periods of shocks and stress. They do not appear out of the blue, but are 
specific manifestations of the livelihood. In periods of hunger, food stocks are opened up and, 
if these are used up, assets like jewellery or cattle are sold and livestock keepers migrate to 
wetter areas. In periods of economic crisis people are inclined to save and to develop 
alternative sources of income, for example, by migrating to the city. The collection of wild 
food and hunting are very old coping strategies; while relying on international disaster relief 
is a modern one. 
 Coping strategies are thus short-term or temporary responses to external shocks and 
stresses. Depending on the severity and length of the latter, coping strategies fade away and 
normal livelihood strategies return. However, this type of equilibrium thinking is often no 
longer adequate for a proper understanding of livelihood strategies. The contextual impact of 
climatic change, world market and politics is growing stronger and shocks and stresses appear 
more frequently, so that it is becoming important to shape the coping strategies more 
permanently. Thus temporary coping mechanisms develop into more permanent ‘adaptive 
strategies’. In the view of CASL (Community Adaptation and Sustainable Livelihoods -1998, 
p.2), adaptive strategies result in an adapted livelihood, then the idea of adaptation vanishes 
and the adaptive strategy is considered to be a normal livelihood strategy. I am inclined to 
think that, at present, new coping and adaptive strategies will have to be developed as 
responses to new shocks and stresses, even before stability in livelihood as a result of a 
previous adaptation has come within reach. 
 
 It becomes clear from the above discussion that ‘sustainable livelihood thinking’ is 
rather locally biased. The way shocks and stresses are perceived is almost exclusively extra-
local. Their impact runs through the five vital ‘capitals’ to livelihood and adaptive strategies. I 
think this notion should be amended in order to help our conceptualisation. A drought, for 
example, is a phenomenon on a macro-regional scale which is locally manifested in lack of 
rainfall. Drought as a climatic phenomenon should therefore be thought of as an extra-local 
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level in natural capital, while soil fertility is local. The same goes for social capital. We 
included above ‘networks’, ‘wider institutions’ and ‘political parties’ in social capital. These 
typically represent higher levels of scale in social capital as compared to ‘mutual help from 
neighbours’. For these reasons, vital ‘capitals’ in figure 4 are no longer perceived 
monolithically as in the previous figure, but levels of scale are distinguished. 
 
* Figure 4 - Shocks, stress and coping mechanisms resulting in adaptive strategies and new 
livelihood * 
 
 Bake’s people, the Fulani, the same people from whom Boureima buys 
most of his cattle, have been living in northern Benin since the 19th century. They originate 
from the Sahel. Up to the present time, groups of Fulani flee to Benin from Burkina Faso, 
Niger or Nigeria because of drought or political unrest . In the Sahel they were semi-nomadic 
pastoralists; their livelihood was built on cattle and milk. They also grew grain in the Sahel, 
but with variable success, because of the drier climate. From the day when they arrived in 
North Benin with their thinned-out herds, or even without cattle, crop cultivation became 
more important than before. Despite the small fields they were able to get, crop growing 
remained more important for many of them than cattle keeping. Because of the importance of 
food crops, their way of life and, therefore, their cattle keeping, has become more sedentary. 
Practically spoken, they are more agro-pastoralists than they have ever been before (De 
Haan 1997a). Nevertheless they look upon themselves as pastoralists and their primary 
objective is the reconstitution of a large herd. 
Migration to other areas because of environmental shocks or stresses is a well-known part 
semi-nomadic pastoralist livelihood. Paying more attention to crop cultivation because of the 
loss of cattle is seen as a temporary solution, that is, as a coping strategy. For the Fulani in 
North Benin agriculture eventually became an adaptive strategy. For those groups who 
settled in the region a long time ago agro-pastoralism became a new livelihood. However, 
population growth, the increasing importance of cash crops, lack of pastures, conflicts with 
peasants, the demand for meat and the rise of cattle markets will make new coping strategies 
necessary and will eventually result in new adaptive strategies6).  
 
Actor and structure 
 
 So far I have explained how actors use available and accessible ‘capitals’ for their 
livelihood strategies and the increased impact increased impact of shocks and stresses. Many 
changes in livelihood strategies result from the influence of external factors. However, 
livelihood strategies may also change as an consequence of internal  influences, such as a 
drive for increased prosperity and welfare. ‘Human agency’ is the capacity of people to 
integrate experiences into their livelihood strategies and to look for outlets for ambitions and 
solutions to problems. Human agency enables them to reshape social conditions. Initially, we 
think of individual decision making and the way individuals use vital ‘capitals’, including the 
creation of access and claims that they can really use these ‘capitals’. However, social 
behaviour cannot be understood only in terms of individual motives, intentions and interests 
(Long 1992). We have learned from Bourdieu (1977; 1990), Giddens (1984) and Long (1989, 
1992) that individual behaviour is socially constructed. ‘Agency’ is embodied in the 
individual, but embedded in social relations through which it can become effective. Individual 
choices and decision making are embedded in values and norms and institutional structures. 
Through ‘human agency’ structures may change. Agency causes livelihood changes in the 
11 
 
 
long run too. Through agency individuals and social groups, i.e. actors, influence structure. 
Therefore, agency is the hinge between actor and structure. 
 
 Initially, the ‘sustainable livelihood’ approach (Chambers and Conway 1992; 
Chambers 1995) was strongly actor-oriented and had all the characteristics of the neo-populist 
view (Blaikie 1998) on development. Neo-populism is characterised by an unconditional 
belief in the adaptive capabilities of man, i.e. the human capacity to adapt repeatedly to 
changing circumstances and still to guarantee a sustainable exploitation of scarce resources. 
The strong actor and micro-orientation results in much attention being paid to local or 
indigenous knowledge and local agendas with which policy can adopt (De Haan 1999). This 
orientation is important, but not sufficient. The ‘sustainable livelihood’ approach has since 
become more realistic (Hoon et al. 1997), notably in its recognition of structural bottlenecks 
or even barriers and the necessary quest for a hinge between structure and actor. Large donors 
like UNDP and the British Department for International Development (DFID) and even the 
poverty reduction programme of the World Bank, have now embraced the approach. They 
have recognised the structural bottlenecks, however they speak with a so far unjustified 
optimism about their ability to enhance the sustainability of livelihoods (Ashley and Carney 
1999; Carney 1999b; see also Amalric 1998).  
 The reciprocity between structure and actor is most clearly identified in Hoon’s et al.  
view of sustainable livelihood (Hoon et al. 1997, p.4). According to these authors, livelihood 
strategies change because livelihood is a dynamic domain that combines (1) opportunities and 
assets available to a group of people to attain their goals and aspirations with (2) the 
interaction with and exposure to series of favourable or harmful ecological, social, economic 
and political perturbations that may help or hinder a group’s capacity to make a living. 
Individuals and social groups are considered by Hoon et al. to be in interaction with their 
environment. They are neither powerless objects nor free agents who can become whatever 
they choose. There are feedback loops between actors themselves and between actor and the 
context in which they live.  
The following story of Bake’s carrier in cheese production illustrates at the micro-level the 
capacity of people to change structures as a feedback mechanism to stress.  
 
 When Bake received too little milk to sell she was very discouraged. In 
those days she often went to her uncle who lives in the regional capital Parakou for money 
and help. Then she started to spin cotton for traditional garments, but this was not profitable. 
Next she started to buy small quantities of milk from other women in her camp and sold it at a 
very small margin. Her secret was that she first skimmed off the milk in order to keep the 
cream for herself. In this way she did not have to buy oil for cooking. If the next day the milk 
had become thick and sour, she mixed it with warm water to create more milk and then sold 
in the neighbouring peasant village. She used a slightly smaller measuring bowl than the 
other women did. 
Then came the breakthrough: with some other women whose families had lost all their cattle 
because of rinderpest, they asked a women from another village to teach them how to make 
cheese. Fulani women are entitled to sell part of the milk they receive from men. Cheese was 
already produced in other parts of the region, but never by Fulani women. Heating milk, 
which is necessary in cheese making, is a strong taboo among Fulani. It may cause bad luck 
to the herd. A real Fulani woman should not get involved with cheese making, it is rather a 
craft for peasant women, who were sometimes former slaves of the Fulani. 
Despite the dishonour, Bake and her neighbours now make cheese, because it pays better 
than selling milk. There are always Fulani women who do not have time to sell milk in the 
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peasant village or who are not allowed to leave the compound. These are the ones, Bake and 
her friends buy their milk from. In the rainy season there is plenty of milk, but that is also 
when a lot of cheese is produced, so there is a possibility that very little money will be earned. 
At the start Bake earned more from cheese production than she does now, simply because 
more milk was available. Now more milk sellers have started to produce cheese themselves. 
Others became jealous of the higher incomes of the cheese makers and refused to sell milk to 
them any longer. They spoke shame about the cheese makers because they did not respect the 
taboo and started to ask more money for their milk. Fortunately, some other women had pity 
on them and continued to sell their milk.  
Finally, the quarrel was settled. It was agreed that fresh milk would no longer be sold outside 
the women’s own camp. A rotation system was drawn up of which women could buy milk on 
which days to prepare cheese. As a consequence, milk has become a commodity, which 
always has its price and is no longer given as a present or gift. 
Sometimes Bake prefers to sell milk instead of making cheese. She says: “It feels better for 
me, as a Fulani women, to walk the streets of Kandi with a calabash of milk than with an 
enamel bowl of cheese. Cheese makers are still considered poor” (IJsendijk 1999, p.56).  
 
 A question that remains is how to conceptualise impact and feedback loops between 
actor and structure. Structure should be perceived as the shell in which the five ‘capitals’ are 
embedded. The social part of ‘structure’ consists of the shell of common rules, norms and 
sanctions mutually agreed or handed down, around social capital. The economic part includes  
supply and demand; and the political structure contains power relations. As I have already 
distinguished between different levels of scale in vital ‘capitals’, this can also be done with 
respect to structure (see fig. 5). For example, there are local and extra-local power relations 
structuring livelihood strategies. The precise division between structure and ‘capitals’ is not 
easy to determine. ‘Capitals’ are used by actors to ‘produce’ livelihood; structure determines 
the direction of the outcome, although the direction may eventually change through the 
agency of actor’s livelihood strategies. The feedback loops of agency from actor to structure 
run through the vital capitals. 
 
* Figure 5 - Agency in livelihood strategies * 
 
 Despite the success of Bake and her neighbours in cheese making, it is still too early to 
call this livelihood sustainable. Nevertheless, her life history clearly demonstrates that she has 
overcome her exclusion from milk distribution in her extended family, although her 
livelihood remains vulnerable like those of the other 1.3 to 3 billion people in the world I 
referred to above. Boureima, on the other hand, get along well.  
Why do some people manage to have a sustainable livelihood and others not? Is it a matter of 
available capitals and access to it, of fewer or more shocks and stresses, of sufficient or 
insufficient agency? 
 Gore’s review of the literature (1994, pp.6-8) on social exclusion in Africa is 
interesting in this respect. He concludes that there is an important split between two types of 
studies on social exclusion. (1) The first approach interprets social exclusion as a mechanism 
by which elites exclude others from access to resources with the objective of maximising their 
own returns. Social exclusion in that view is a process in which social groups try to 
monopolise specific, mostly economic, opportunities to their own advantage. They often use 
certain social or physical characteristics such as race, gender, language ethnicity, origin or 
religion to legitimise this insulation of opportunities. Social exclusion is then the consequence 
of social closure: a form of collective social action which gives rise to social categories of 
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eligibles and ineligibles. (2) A second approach stems from marginalisation studies. While, in 
the first view, exclusion literally means ‘being excluded’, in marginalisation studies it is 
rather ‘being left behind’ after a failed attempt to be included. Exclusion in the latter view is 
caused by bottlenecks in the access to capital. In a historical perspective, a pattern of social 
differentiation emerges between actors who succeeded in choosing successful trajectories of 
upward mobility and those who did not. The latter were left behind as others improved their 
position and were excluded as a result (Gore 1994, p. 7). 
 Characterising the divide between these two points of view as a bifurcation means that 
there is little exchange of findings and mutual testing. I agree with Gore (1994, p. 8) that a 
hinge between these two points of view should be developed. Access to vital capital can 
always be denied, but this does not block any possibility of agency on the part of the 
excluded. It rather structures their field of action. For example, African governments have 
tried for a long time to use price policies to reduce food prices in order to privilege their urban 
rank and file at the cost of the farmers. This had adversely affected farmers’ incomes. 
However, because farmers started selling food crops on illicit markets and smuggled produce 
across the border, it was eventually not the farmers, but the government that was stung. 
Livelihood strategies engender processes of inclusion and exclusion: it is important to note 
that the sustainable livelihood of one actor may result in the social exclusion of another, or at 
least structure his of her field of action. 
 
 Livelihood strategies are developed in an arena of conflicting or co-operating actors 
or, in the words of Olivier de Sardan (1993), in a ‘local political arena’. As Long (1992) 
notes, development workers and their projects play an important role in the arena. Both 
Olivier de Sardan and Long are interested in the articulation of development interventions 
with the local population. Implicit assumptions about the rural and urban society, 
representations and the more hidden agendas of the development workers themselves and 
livelihood strategies of the local population make it difficult to plan or even foresee the 
outcome of development interventions. I find the attention to differences among local actors, 
called strategic groups by Olivier de Sardan and Bierschenk (1994), more attractive than 
Long’s approach. According to the authors strategic groups are not permanent social groups 
who present themselves irrespective of the problem posed. They are rather groups of differing 
composition who present themselves depending on the problem. Sometimes it is an 
occupational group, sometimes it is a status group like women or youths, sometimes it is a 
kinship group, sometimes a network of mutual assistance or clients of a patron, and 
sometimes a group of individuals with a common historical trajectory of livelihood strategies. 
Conflicting interests exist between these groups which are fought out in the local political 
arena. 
In view of the specific content which the concept of ‘strategic groups’ has been given in the 
past (Evers and Schiel 1988) and the looser portrayal by Olivier de Sardan and Bierschenk, I 
prefer to use the term ‘interest groups’ 7). 
It is important to note that livelihood strategies not only at the individual level, but even more 
at higher levels of decision making, such as the household or the extended family, are not 
singular activities. They comprise a large number of production and labour activities using 
vital ‘capitals’ in various compositions. Livelihood strategies are thus multiple. Depending on 
their role, individuals belong to different interest groups and therefore the dividing lines 
between individuals and between groups are never rigid, but variable and fuzzy. General 
categories as ‘the local population’ or ‘the poor’ do not exist. In the local arena of livelihood 
strategies, inclusion and exclusion may differ in each dimension. 8)
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 In Bake’s camp it was agreed that milk would no longer be sold outside 
the camp and that a rotation system would determine which women could buy milk and when. 
The rotation system divided the camp into three parts, in fact, three extended families living 
in various wuro’s. Within each kinship group, which now acted as an interest group, two 
women of the group could buy up the daily supply of milk; the next day two others. They were 
not allowed to buy milk outside the interest group (IJsendijk 1999). 
 
Finally, I have some notes on the ‘local nature’ of the political arena. If vital ‘capitals’ are 
characterised by different scales and are being used in livelihood strategies, then the political 
arena is, by definition, a local and extra-local arena at the same time. Interest groups may 
include extra-locals, and locals may use extra-locally situated capitals. Moreover, the 
argument that the analysis of livelihood strategies should not be narrowed to direct ‘actor-to-
actor’ contacts only should be considered (De Groot 1992, p. 323). An actor’s opportunities 
and choices are influenced by other (distant, sometimes even global) actors’ strategies without 
face-to-face contacts occurring. 
 
 
3. The importance of globalisation and localisation for livelihood 
 
 
 In this section I propose to discuss the main features of today’s globalisation 
considering the consequences for studying sustainable livelihoods and processes of social 
inclusion and exclusion. In particular I will examine the significance of localisation. 
 
Localisation 
 
 Inevitably, natural resources occupy an important place in the sustainable livelihood 
debate. Everywhere there is fear of environmental degradation, everywhere attention is drawn 
to the need for sustainable prosperity, in other words, it has become an article of faith to 
prevent depletion of natural resources while striving to increase prosperity. According to 
Hyden (1998, p. 8), ecosystems should even be the point of departure for sustainable 
livelihood. With the attention being paid to natural resources, locality is coming to occupy an 
important position in the debate about livelihood and social exclusion, because natural 
resources tend to be place-specific. Because of this and because many livelihood studies are 
actor-oriented, a local orientation dominates 
 However, it has become clear from the previous section that the local arena should 
also be considered in a wider perspective. I have already indicated elsewhere (De Haan 1999, 
p. 15; 1995, p. 122) how to go beyond the local level, notably ‘by studying how the adaptive 
capabilities of actors are influenced, restricted or stimulated by integration in larger social-
cultural, economic and political-cultural, economic and political entities...”. “After all, the 
need for increase in prosperity coupled with sustainable exploitation of natural resources can 
only be understood (and this remark does not apply only to ‘low-income countries’) if 
increasing interdependence and globalisation are accounted for”.  
It is interesting in this connection to consider Bookfield’s (1992) ‘nested hierarchy’ approach. 
Taking the example of sustainable agriculture, he explains that the agronomic sustainability of 
the field has to fit into a sustainable exploitation of the farm as a whole. In the application of 
fallow and rotation a sustainable exploitation of the field’s soil can be achieved that cannot be 
achieved at the individual level of the field. Sustainable exploitation at the farm level should 
fit into that of the agro-ecological zone or river basin. Take, for example, soil and water 
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conservation measures such as terracing or irrigation, which can only yield sustainable effects 
if organised at an extra-farm level of scale. Staying with Brookfield, environmental policy 
should also be organised at the regional level.  
This is also how the complex relationships between the local arena and the context can be 
perceived. However, I have reservations about Brookfield’s plea for the regional level as the 
most suitable level for analysis of livelihood, as national and international levels are now 
becoming increasingly important. Nevertheless, I will show below that, because of 
globalisation, these higher levels of scale are more closely approaching the regional level than 
ever before. Moreover, it is questionable whether the notion of nested hierarchy is still valid. 
As I have already explained, livelihood strategies are not only multiple, but increasingly 
multi-local. 
 
 Bake’s livelihood strategies are multiple in the sense that (1) cheese 
making is her main activity, (2) her husband provides her with food and housing, although 
she also produces some of these subsistence goods herself, (3) she was supported for some 
time by her uncle in the city. Her livelihood strategies have only a limited range and take 
place in the camp where she lives (and buys her milk and produces her cheese), the nearby 
peasant village of Alifiarou and the town of Kandi 20 km farther on, where she sells her 
cheese. 
 Boureima’s livelihood is more specialised, although he is a trader as 
well as a cattle owner, because he has invested in herds. However, his strategies are much 
more complex spatially and range from cattle markets in northern Benin to the butchers and 
abattoirs of Lomé, Cotonou and Ibadan. 
 
 I expect the multi-locality of livelihood strategies to become increasingly important in 
the present era of globalisation. I will therefore first examine the phenomenon of globalisation 
and then will return to its consequences for livelihood strategies. 
 
Globalisation and localisation 
 
 Globalisation is said to be financial flash capital that shoots from one stock exchange 
to another, drives up share prices and drops them again like dominoes. Globalisation is 
increased world wide competition between firms, firms which have plants all over the world 
and are hardly susceptible to influence by national governments any more. Globalisation is 
consumer goods from all over the world in the supermarket. Globalisation is people watching 
the news from all over the world on their television set, telephoning and e-mailing far-away 
friends, going on holiday all over the world. Globalisation is streetscapes in Europe, America 
and Asia which you cannot tell apart; asphalt everywhere, everywhere the same cars, the 
same neon signs of Coca Cola, McDonald’s or Philips, people in a hurry and youngsters on 
Nikes. 
De Ruijter (1997, pp. 381-382) defined globalisation as technological innovations in 
transport, automation and telecommunications resulting in massive exchanges of people, 
goods, services and ideas. Markets and social relations become world wide. Standardisation 
of consumption and production and homogenisation of society are the result. Events in one 
place are quickly echoed in other parts on the globe. Globalisation is increasingly no longer 
considered as a process,  but as a characteristic of the ‘global system’: each particular entity 
has to be understood within the framework of the world as a whole. A www of 
interdependencies has been spun (De Ruijter 1997, p. 382). 
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 There are, in fact, two views on globalisation (Schuurman 1997, p. 152). The first sees 
globalisation as increased homogenisation and interdependency all over the world in the 
cultural, social and economic dimensions. In this view, clearly identifiable centres give way 
to nodes which can differ depending on time and dimension. For some authors the driving 
forces are mostly socio-political, for others primarily economic, stemming from production 
and markets. This is the view I have formulated above. 
The second view, which I am inclined to support, sees a close association between the global 
and the local, and is therefore sometimes called ‘glocalisation’(Robertson 1995). This view 
also identifies the trend towards global markets and politics, but notes an increased diversity 
and an increased importance of regionalism and community as well. Cultural fragmentation, 
for example, with its reinvention of local traditions and identities, is seen as an answer to the 
loss of identity through homogenisation.  
  ‘Localisation’ is often limited to the social and cultural domains, but Miyakawa 
(1998) has shown in his study of the Japanese automobile industry that localisation proved to 
be indispensable to enable the industry to outclass global competition. 
 
Localisation, in his view, took the form of high-tech investments in already existing 
production areas of the Tokaido Megalopolis; through its connection with improvement 
(kaizan) movements; through the economies of agglomeration between automobile producers 
and subcontractors; and through the development of venture capital business in housing for 
workers. This did not result in just another example of agglomeration effects, but in a distinct 
production environment. Foreign industries like Volkswagen and Peugeot had no other 
choice but to settle there too (Miyakawa 1998). And there are more examples: one need only 
think of the distinctive position the famous Silicon Valley occupies in the world of information 
technology. 
 
 In the political domain globalisation is often perceived as the end of the state. Some 
will point to the declining credibility of the welfare state, because it was incapable of securing 
society against unemployment and marginalisation. Others think that, with the completion of 
the welfare state, its historical calling has been achieved and its role has become superfluous. 
Others again argue that the state is now being presented with the account for years of nation 
building and the accompanying suppression of identities. 
The fact is that the restructuring of the welfare state with its privatisation and deregulation has 
narrowed the activities of the state. It is also the fact that structural adjustment programmes in 
many ‘ low’ and ‘middle-income countries’ had the same effect. Nor has the state succeeded 
in controlling global markets. In the meantime, new regional and ethnic identities are being 
born or rising again: Belgium is federalising, Catalonia has gained a large degree of 
autonomy, Nigeria creates every now and then a new state in its federation and I do not need 
to elaborate about the Balkans and the former Soviet Union. Lastly, the democratisation that 
started in many ‘low-’ and ‘middle-income countries’ in the 1980s is accompanied by 
decentralisation in an attempt to bring political power closer to the people. Without 
exaggerating its effects, this also contributes to the decline of state influence. 
 
Sustainable livelihood and globalisation 
 
 With respect to livelihood strategies, globalisation may have two important 
consequences: (1) because markets and social relations are becoming world wide, livelihood 
will become multi-local (2) because of glocalisation, the importance of the international and 
the regional-local levels of scale will increase to the detriment of the national level. These 
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expectations are illustrated by the following examples from Morocco and Kenya of successful 
migrant networks and sustainable agricultural intensification. 
 
 Extensive migrant networks exist between various areas in Morocco, 
including the oasis zone in the south, and Western Europe. Migration was initially oriented 
towards France, Belgium and the Netherlands. “ The first reaction to the immigration 
policies in North-western Europe becoming more rigorous, was the shift of emigration into 
the direction of Italy and Spain”. These countries too have now set limits on immigration. In 
order to get around the strict immigration rules, the migrants have put in position a whole 
range of inventive emigration methods. Regular family reunification and new marriages are 
the most legal and secure methods. “Besides, yearly many manage to enter Europe illegally. 
There are strong, region-bound networks between emigrants in Europe and their regions of 
origin, which stands surety for first care, housing and often work too.....”. Although most 
migrants eventually do not return permanently to Morocco, they send considerable sums of 
money to their family members who stayed behind in the oasis”. Many oasis inhabitants 
“have been able to wrest themselves because of this from feudal relations, servitude and 
poverty that used to rule. Emigration has contributed positively to the level of living, housing 
and social status of most of the oasis inhabitants. This had a strong emancipatory effect...”. 
In some oases modern agriculture has expanded significantly. Migrants and remittances are 
at the basis of the purchase of motor pumps, mechanisation and colonisation of the desert. In 
the Sahara a new green frontier seems to be emerging (De Haas 1999- my translation). 
 
 Successful agricultural intensification in Kenya is documented by Tiffin 
et al. (1994). “They use photographs from the 1930s that show severely eroded landscapes in 
the former native reserve of Machakos. 240.000 people lived there at that time. In 1990 the 
population had risen to 1.4 million. The area of land per capita diminished from 2.6 ha to less 
than 1 ha. However, pictures taken at the same spots now, show a prosperous countryside 
with terraces, trees, coffee shrubs and farms. Between 1930 and 1987 yields per ha increased 
6 times. The value of production against constant prices rose ten times and value per capita 
three times.  
The success story began in the colonial period with the forced construction of terraces and 
the introduction of ploughs by Kenyan soldiers returning from the Second World War in 
India. But the boom in soil conservation started after independence: when compulsion 
disappeared; the terracing work was implemented by traditional working parties, and women, 
because of labour migration of men to Nairobi, started to play a leading role. Much organic 
manure is now used. The cattle that used to be collectively herded are now kept in private 
byres, fodder is grown and improved breeds of dairy cattle are used. The extended families of 
the past have become the nuclear families of the present and the status of women has 
improved considerably. 
According to the authors, the initiative for this metamorphosis came from the local people, 
who reshaped their livelihoods on the basis of their own needs, insights and knowledge. In 
doing so, they used their revenues from coffee cultivation and remittances from migration, 
and chose from a range of skills, schooling, support for soil and water conservation and new 
crops (introduced by participatory technology development) offered by the government and a 
number of donors. Facilitating the functioning of markets and the privatisation of 
landownership were the main achievements of the Kenyan government.....It remains unclear if 
the whole population has equally participated in and profited from this intensification, or that 
there have been drop outs, marginalisation of certain groups have occurred etc.” (De Haan 
1999 - my  translation). 
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 The example of migrant network shows that Brookfield’s ‘nested hierarchy’ of levels 
of scale is decreasingly in accord with reality. Locations of livelihood are increasingly no 
longer connected to each other by vertical, hierarchical lines that converge in an upper 
hierarchical level. Instead, they are increasingly connected by direct horizontal lines which 
are, moreover, becoming increasingly longer. Consequently, the structuring of fields of 
action, as discussed in section 2, becomes therefore increasingly multi-local. 
Is this also the end of territoriality as one of the organising principles of society and, at the 
same time, the end of the territory, the bounded space inhabited and structured by a human 
group, that exerts a certain authority over it? According to Conti and Giaccaria (1998, p. 18) 
the concept of ‘internationalisation’ still implies the overcoming of boundaries. They argue 
that ‘internationalisation’ is a concept that considers the world as a differentiated set of areas, 
hierarchically structured as in Brookfield’s ‘nested hierarchy’. In their view, globalisation 
refers not only to the loss of power by nation states, but also to a changing perception of 
national and international levels of scale by actors. With respect to territoriality, therefore, 
globalisation is a qualitatively new step. Through globalisation, national boundaries vanish, 
but local systems, i.e. regions, but without clear-cut physical or administrative boundaries, 
remain. Those local systems (or regions) will become fully-fledged parts of a global system 
instead of hierarchically subordinated sub-units. For example, some people have argued that 
the Machakos case is not representative of Africa. Because of its situation near Nairobi, its 
bimodal rainfall regime and the availability of uncultivated land, the region is considerably 
better off than other parts of Africa. However, from a localisation perspective, Machakos is 
indeed representative, or rather ‘exemplary’. Its success in achieving a more sustainable 
livelihood emerged from a specific constellation of: population pressure; local knowledge 
enriched with experiences from outside even as far from India; profitable world market 
integration by coffee cultivation; multi-locality in livelihood strategies thanks to migration; 
social capital of self-help groups; and enabling government policies. The example of 
Machakos cannot therefore simply be duplicated elsewhere.9)
Globalisation means that, in our perception of processes of inclusion and exclusion in 
multiple livelihood strategies, the different levels of scale both in vital ‘capitals’ and in 
structure come closer to each other and perhaps even fuse in fig. 6. Distant actors also come 
nearer. While the arena becomes increasingly global and livelihood strategies become more 
homogenous, certain local/regional characteristics of the arena remain or will even become 
more marked, and livelihood strategies will need to become more specific. 
 
* Figure 6 - Sustainable livelihood in the era of globalisation * 
 
 Globalisation looks like a new round with new opportunities for livelihood, but it is 
doubtful whether social exclusion will then become a thing of the past. The question then 
arises of what can be the role of governance in this respect. Referring to its role in sustainable 
livelihood, Hyden (1998, p. 6.) defines governance as the ‘measures that involve setting rules 
for the exercise of power and settling conflicts over such rules’. This also means that 
governance determines how and at what level of interest there is deliberation between the 
interests of, for example, a community of marginalised peasants and a few rare animals. 
According to Hyden (1998, pp. 13-14), governance should promote sustainable livelihood and 
prevent social exclusion by (1) nurturing local initiatives, (2) reinforcing civil rights (3) 
improving the quality of relations between actors, notably in the field of trust and reciprocity, 
in other words, enlarging social capital and (4) reinforcing the incomes of poor households, 
including the reorganisation of taxation and public expenditure at the local level - if 
necessary, through non-governmental informal community-based organisations where local 
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government is too weak. Hyden is in fact making a plea for a shift of the core of governance 
to the local level. This again demonstrates the increased importance of localisation. 
 Without denying the usefulness of governance at the national level or insisting that the 
state as a platform for emancipation (Schuurman 1999) has had its day, we can also find 
interesting developments in governance at the other extreme, i.e. at the global level. Lubbers 
and Koorevaar (1999) thinks that the stitches that the national state has dropped or has had to 
drop in globalisation, should be taken up by some sort of ‘global governance’. Global 
governance consists of global co-ordination by supra-regional and international governmental 
institutions of national governments balanced by an emerging international ‘civil society’ 
consisting of global NGOs of environmental conservationists, voters, believers, consumers 
etc. Both have a task in the regulation of markets, notably the control of transnational firms 
operating on the global market. He makes a plea, in fact, for a new kind of (global) 
governance emerging from a symbiosis between governments, transnational firms and global 
civil society. 
The future of development co-operation must also be viewed in this global perspective. 
Development co-operation has undoubtedly contributed to globalisation of markets and 
investments, but this does not mean, of course, that it can be dispensed with (Hoebink 1997). 
It is precisely the humanitarian side of development co-operation with its immunisation and 
literacy campaigns, housing programmes and valued elements such as the provision of micro-
credit and debts rescheduling, that can be seen as a step of global social security. 
 
 At first sight, the era of globalisation seems to pass by Bake’s 
livelihood strategies. I made clear that her income did not exceed $1 a day, which placed her 
among the excluded of this world. However, it has become clear in the course of my 
presentation that she is not excluded. She has overcome her exclusion from milk distribution 
by producing cheese and to make cheese she had to overcome the traditions of her people. 
That was so successful that now all women in her camp produce cheese.  
Bake’s livelihood strategies mainly took place in a local arena. Because she participated in 
different local interest groups (her extended family in the camp; her uncle’s household in the 
city; the group of cheese producers) she was able to become successful. 
Whether her livelihood will be sustainable on the long run, it is too early to say. That depends 
on a number of factors that she cannot influence. An increase in the milk supply depends on 
rainfall, the size of the herds and the commercial orientation of herders. Only the latter may 
be influenced by demand from the cheese makers. The demand for cheese depends on the 
growth in incomes in the region. A rise in her own productivity depends on technological 
investments for which she needs credit. And that is only the part that concerns her cheese 
production. She has never attended classes, she has to walk far to obtain clean drinking water 
and medical care is expensive and of poor quality. 
Nevertheless, the globalisation of her livelihood strategies has already started. The Maggi 
cubes she buys come from Senegal; the rice for a feast from Thailand or Pakistan; her 
matches and her husband’s bicycle from Nigeria. As a result of booming cotton exports, the 
economy of Bake’s region is expanding fast. Even her husband now cultivates cotton. The 
sustainability of that economic growth partly depends on the success of the privatisation of 
cotton marketing in Benin, on the negotiations in the WTO and on the opening up of a niche 
market in Europe for organic cotton from Benin. Representatives of an NGO of Fulani from 
the city are active in Bake’s local political arena. They organise cultural festivals and 
literacy campaigns and hope to give a voice to the Fulani in the process of administrative 
decentralisation which is slowly getting under way. They are working hard on raising their 
people and en passant on moulding a Beninese Fulani identity to serve as a glue in the 
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recruitment of their political rank and file. Their contacts extend to donors and scientific 
institutions in Europe. 
 
 In Boureima’s livelihood strategies, the fusion between different levels 
of scale in vital ‘capitals’ and structure is already apparent. Because of booming cotton 
exports, farmers are now investing in draught animals and new groups of suppliers and 
buyers, each with their specific impact, are appearing on the cattle market. Market 
organisation in Northern Benin is becoming more formal and transparent. For Boureima it is 
still a more or less open question as to what his cattle will be worth in Cotonou or Lomé upon 
his arrival. His colleagues in Burkina Faso are already much better informed about prices on 
the markets of Abidjan in Ivory Coast, because of better lines of communication on that side. 
They are able to react much more quickly than Boureima, partly because formalities at the 
Burkina-Ivory Coast border have become quicker and transparent after structural 
adjustment, so that the need for smuggling disappeared. 
A few years ago it looked as if traders like Boureima and, with him, cattle keepers in West 
Africa would face serious competition from imports of frozen, subsidised meat from the 
European Union. This meat was taken out of the European market at guaranteed prices to 
farmers. For Boureima it was false alarm, because Benin imported very little meat. 
Elsewhere in West Africa, too, traders and cattle keepers suffered few losses, because the 
frozen meat was of inferior quality and was therefore bought by consumers who never bought 
Sahelian meat . Nevertheless a short, one-sided, publicity campaign by European NGOs was 
sufficient to cause the European Union to change tack. One of the positive after-effects was 
the financing, inter alia, by the European Union, of a monitoring system of cattle and meat 
prices in West Africa that has contributed to more transparent markets. 
. 
Boureima’s and even Bake’s arenas of livelihood strategies have thus become increasingly 
global: distant actors are coming nearer and levels of scale in vital ‘capitals’ and even in 
structure are fusing. However, if we consider Bake in particular: the opportunities for her to 
sustain her livelihood and thus guarantee her social inclusion do not seem more gloomy with 
globalisation than without.  
 
 
4.  Tentative conclusions for research on sustainable livelihood 
 
From the conceptual model ‘sustainable livelihood in the era of globalisation’, which I have 
just outlined a tentative research agenda can be derived: 
• With respect to access: what vital ‘capitals’, human, natural, physical, financial and social, 
do actors, both individuals and social groups, have at their disposal to shape their 
livelihood; which structural factors shape access, how do actors acquire access to those 
vital ‘capitals; how important is social capital as compared to the other vital ‘capitals? 
• With respect to multipleness: which livelihood strategies are distinguished; which interest 
groups figure in the livelihood arena; how do actors manage to be part of different interest 
groups?  
• With respect to vulnerability: how dynamic are livelihood strategies, that is, how do they 
adapt to temporary and more permanent shocks and stresses;  what temporary coping 
strategies do different actors develop and how do these become more permanent adaptive 
strategies? 
• With respect to multi-locality: how multi-local are livelihood strategies; do vital capitals 
fuse at different levels of scale; how does the structuring of fields of action develops?  
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• With respect to social inclusion and exclusion: how do they work out with respect to 
different dimensions of multiple livelihood strategies; how are actors’ livelihood strategies 
influenced by structures through the vital ‘capitals’ they use; what role does agency play as 
the hinge between actor and structure; do actors’ livelihood strategies change structures? 
• Do structures fuse at different levels of scale? Is the national level losing ground to the 
benefit of both local/regional and global levels? Are processes of inclusion and exclusion 
becoming more homogeneous and more specific at the same time? Is global governance 
developing into a global social security or safety net system and is it capable of preventing 
social exclusion? 
As a consequence research on sustainable livelihood will increasingly have to become multi-
dimensional because livelihood strategies are multiple. Therefore the need for 
interdisciplinary is compelling.  
Because livelihood strategies in a globalising era take place at different locations, research 
has to be multi-local too, i.e. will increasingly have to take place simultaneously in different 
places. This makes high demands on both the organisation and techniques of the research and 
on the researchers. Moreover, it will have to be comparative if it aims to draw conclusions 
about globalisation and globalisation-localisation trends (De Haan1999; Blaikie and De Haan 
1998). If markets and social relations are supposed to become world wide, then research has 
to be global, too. One thinks first, of course, of comparative studies analysing similarities and 
increased diversity in ‘middle’ and ‘low income countries’. But the Third World no longer 
exists and an exclusive orientation on these ‘middle’ and ‘low’ income countries therefore 
misses the point of globalisation. To understand the processes of inclusion and exclusion in 
livelihood in the era of globalisation, similar and connected processes must be studied across 
the globe in ‘low-income’, ‘middle-income’ and ‘high-income countries’, in Africa, in Asia 
and in Latin America, in Eastern and Western Europe, in the former Soviet Union etc. 
Scepticism about the possibilities of such comparative studies is inappropriate. I think that 
development researchers underestimate the potential of their experience and skills in a 
glocalising world. They should seek for strategic co-operation alliances with research which 
focus on ‘high-income countries’.  
 It will be important to couple research in order to arrive at comparative research 
projects which take contrasting livelihood strategies as a point of departure, to shed more 
light on certain aspects of multi-locality, multiplicity and fusing levels of scale. It would be 
interesting to undertake studies which concentrate on the sometimes striking resemblance of 
historical processes in Western Europe and present processes in Eastern Europe or Africa10) . 
However, it would be even more important to undertake comparative studies in order to 
highlight current coherence in the processes of social inclusion and exclusion in each area. It 
goes without saying that historical depth and a regional perspective will prove their 
usefulness in this respect. 
Finally, I am convinced that globalisation means also that our researchers from “low and 
middle income countries” should also have the opportunity to study for themselves 
globalisation in ‘high-income countries’. Also in the international research community we 
need to maintain solidarity, reduce dependence and increase reciprocity.  
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5. Notes 
 
(1)  
Professor in Development Studies at the University of Nijmegen and Director of CIDIN, 
Centre for International Development Issues Nijmegen. This text is a revised and expanded 
version of my inaugural lecture presented in March 2000 on my ceremonial entrance into 
office. I am obliged to Jaap van Dokkum for skilfully compiling and drawing the figures in 
this text. Robert Symonds corrected my not always perfect English. 
 
(2) 
The life histories of Bake Machou and other women are portrayed by Deborah IJsendijk in 
her Master’s thesis on the Human Geography of Developing Countries at the University of 
Amsterdam, completed in 1999. We Dance in our Own Way ... Livelihood Strategies of Fulbe 
Women and Change in Northern Benin analyses the coping strategies of Fulani (or Fulbe) 
women selling milk and producing cheese in relation to milk availability and access to milk. I 
am grateful to Deborah for allowing me to use one of her case studies. 
 
(3) 
The case of Boureima is presented by Dr. Paul Quarles van Ufford in an article in Dutch in 
Geografie in 1999. He completed his research project on the structure of cattle trade and 
cattle markets in Benin and the strategies of cattle traders in 1999 with an excellent Ph.D. 
thesis in geography entitled  Trade and Traders. The Making of the Cattle Market in Benin. 
The study examines how West African cattle traders, by using their economic, social and 
ideological capital, play a substantial role in the transformation of markets. It explored 
interactions between actors and structure using a variety of methodological tools, including 
analysis of supply, demand and prices, of trade flows and trader’s accumulation paths and 
trade, business and labour networks. Various life histories of traders are portrayed. I am 
indebted to Paul Quarles van Ufford for allowing me to use this case study. 
 
(4)  
I am aware that in the debate on sustainability of  livelihoods often an environmental 
extension is added. In those cases (cf. Scoones 1998, p.5) ‘sustainable’ not only equates social 
inclusion but ‘not undermining the natural resource base’ as well. However, I feel this 
extension puts much emphasis on the natural environment, whereas socio-economic aspects 
are of equal importance. Environmental sustainability is included in ‘satisfaction of self-
defined basic needs’ and does not have to be stressed separately. 
 
 (5) 
Although this typology in five vital ‘capitals’ is exclusive to me, I am aware that other authors 
discern other ‘capitals’ depending on their specific interests and divergent definitions. I 
include Bourdieu’s ‘symbolic capital’, prestige and status, in social capital. Hamelink (1999, 
p.109) mentions ‘information capital’, meaning the total of financial capacity to bear the costs 
of internet access and use, the technical capability to use the internet infrastructure, the 
intellectual capacity to filter and evaluate information, the motivation to search actively for 
information and, finally, the capacity to use information in social life. Following Grégroire 
and Labazée (1993, cited in Quarles van Ufford 1999b, p. 22), who pointed to the ideological 
conditions, notably religion, for trade in Africa, Quarles van Ufford (1999b, p. 264) uses 
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‘ideological capital’ as a reinterpretation of symbolic capital, adding religion and ethnic 
identity. 
 
(6) 
In Le poisson est devenu du mil Antje van Driel examines the changes in livelihood triggered 
by a period of relative drought in the Niger valley of Benin. The most important livelihood 
systems were those of Dendi agro-fishermen and Fulani agro-pastoralists, who both used 
alternately the floodplain for fishing and grazing. With decreasing rainfall and dramatically 
lowered water tables in the river, the fish yields of the Dendi dwindled. However, the same 
cause gave birth to excellent new farming lands in the floodplain. The Dendi successfully 
adapted their livelihood strategies to the stiffer environmental conditions by concentrating on 
agriculture. ‘Where the herds once grazed and the fisherman fished, the land is now used for 
farming ....’ The Fulani have to look for pastures elsewhere and also come increasingly into 
conflict with farmers because their herds cause damage to the encroaching fields when they 
try to reach watering places and pastures in the floodplain (Van Driel 1998). We may say that 
these Fulani still represent the ‘coping’ case and not yet that of adaptation. 
 
(7) 
According to Evers and Schiel (1988, pp. 10-25), strategic groups are made up of persons 
having a common identity, a certain degree of internal organisation and active implementation 
of political and economic goals, especially stimulated by situations of conflict. The authors 
introduced the notion in their analysis of processes of class formation in Southeast Asia. The 
notion was introduced in the African development discourse by Olivier de Sardan and 
Bierschenk (1994). In daily development parlance the notion of strategic groups refers to all 
kind of interest groups which people may be part of simultaneously. 
 
(8) 
In referring to Berry, Gore raises a point which needs to be looked into further (Berry 1998: 
in Gore 1994, p. 12). According to Berry, it is not social exclusion that is a current problem in 
Africa, but “rather the opposite - the fact that many Africans have become locked into 
multiple channels of access and strategies of resource management which perpetuate low 
productivity. But, partly as a result of low productivity and agrarian crisis, it may be that in 
the long run, increasing numbers of impoverished rural people simply divest themselves, 
intentionally or no, of membership of access-controlling institutions and thereby form a new 
category of the dispossessed”. 
 
(9)  
De Bruijne, Dietz and Verrest (1999, p.42) put it this way: “globalisation and localisation 
result in a larger number of constantly shifting regions, each with its own specificity of 
nature, pace and direction of economic, social and cultural change, and in respect of spatial 
arrangements and land use” (my translation). 
 
(10) 
Hüsken, for example, has made an exemplary comparison of the historical development of the 
modern bureaucratic state and its impact on peasants and villagers in two different parts of the 
globe, i.e. the Gondosari in Java and Groesbeek (known for its history of smuggling) near 
Nijmegen. Confrontations between foresters and villagers followed a similar pattern and had 
remarkably similar outcomes’ (Hüsken 1997, p. 257). 
24 
 
 
Strikingly, Internationale Samenwerking, the magazine of  the information service of the 
Dutch Ministry of Development Co-operation also recently published an article under the 
headline that the Dutch province of Drenthe in the year 1949, the year that Dutch 
development aid started, resembled the present ‘Third World’ (Internationale Samenwerking 
Sept. 1999). Some respondents in that article did not agree with the comparison, a 
disagreement that mainly reflected their own perceptions of present-day low-income 
countries. According to Internationale Samenwerking, the crisis in the peat market, which 
resulted in low wages and poverty, poor housing, export of profits, and paternalistic 
(government) aid in those days, resembled the present situation in low-income countries. 
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